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Adjudicated Juveniles and Post-Conviction Litigation
Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider
Introduction
Post-conviction relief is a vital part of the American justice system. By filing post-conviction
petitions after the close of direct appeal, defendants can raise claims based on evidence outside
the record that was not known or available at the time of trial.
One common use of post-conviction relief is to file a claim related to a previously unknown
constitutional violation that occurred at trial, such as ineffective assistance of counsel. If a
defendant’s trial attorney performed ineffectively by failing to call, for instance, an alibi witness,
then that omission is unlikely to be reflected in the trial record – but in post-conviction
proceedings, the defendant may seek to expand the record to include evidence of such
ineffectiveness. If a court sitting in post-conviction hears that evidence and sides with the
defendant, the usual remedy is to grant a new trial. Without access to the opportunities to
supplement the record that are afforded by post-conviction proceedings, however, a defendant
who suffers ineffective assistance of counsel often has no opportunity for relief.
Post-conviction proceedings are also often used to raise newly discovered evidence of innocence.
This use of post-conviction proceedings, in particular, has met with much success, especially
since the development of DNA technology has enabled attorneys to subject trial evidence to
scientific testing and to introduce those test results post-conviction as newly discovered evidence
of innocence. To date, 289 individuals have been exonerated by DNA testing, almost all of it
conducted through the vehicle of post-conviction proceedings. Each of these individuals stands
as living proof of the fact that access to post-conviction relief is an essential part of a justiceseeking judicial system.
This article examines the troubling disparities in access to post-conviction relief between adults
and juveniles that appear to occur in many jurisdictions. Some states explicitly make postconviction relief unavailable to defendants who are tried as juveniles while granting such access
to adults. In many other states, legislatures have drafted laws governing the availability of postconviction proceedings that are vague and ambiguous, leading to uncertainty about whether
juvenile defendants may take advantage of such proceedings. This disparity exists despite the
fact that those tried in juvenile court need access to post-conviction remedies just as much as
those tried in adult court.
Section I of this article explains that individuals adjudicated in juvenile court may be in
particular need of post-conviction remedies, while demonstrating that their access to these
remedies is far too often unclear, severely limited, or explicitly denied. Section II offers two
examples of real-life juvenile defendants who either were or would have been harmed by the
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unavailability of post-conviction relief. Section III concludes with a call for clarity and
increased juvenile access to post-conviction proceedings nationwide.
Section I
A. Adjudicated Juveniles Need Post-Conviction Remedies
The ability to invoke post-conviction relief is critical for adjudicated juveniles. Youth have been
shown to be especially vulnerable as a population to wrongful conviction – and, in particular, to
false confession. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions, juveniles are
categorically less mature, less able to weigh risks and long-term consequences, more vulnerable
to external pressures, and more compliant with authority figures than are adults. 1 The Court has
concluded, in turn, that these youthful traits mean that the risk of false confession is “all the more
troubling” and “all the more acute” when the “subject of a custodial interrogation is a juvenile.” 2
This conclusion has roots that stretch back to the 1967 Supreme Court case In re Gault, in which
the Supreme Court first explained that “authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the
reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.” 3
A slew of empirical studies have affirmed the accuracy of this conclusion. The leading study of
125 proven false confession cases, cited by the Supreme Court in Corley v. United States and
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, found that 63% of false confessors were under the age of twenty-five
and 32% were under eighteen. 4 By way of comparison, contemporaneous statistics reveal that
juveniles made up only 8% of the individuals arrested for murder and 16% of the individuals
arrested for rape in the United States. 5 In another respected study of 340 exonerations that have
taken place since 1989, researchers found that juveniles under the age of eighteen were three
times as likely to falsely confess as adults; a full 42% of juvenile exonerees had falsely
confessed, compared to only 13% of wrongfully convicted adults. 6 And the most recent study
addressing the subject – an examination of 103 wrongful convictions of factually innocent
teenagers and children – found that a false confession contributed to 31.1% of the juvenile cases
studied, as compared against only 17.8% of adult wrongful convictions. 7 Laboratory studies,
moreover, have replicated these real-world empirics; in one famed laboratory study, a majority
1

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009).
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, June 16, 2011, slip op. at 6 (citing Brief of the Center on Wrongful Convictions of
Youth); see also Corley v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009) (stating that “[t]here is mounting empirical evidence
that these pressures [associated with custodial interrogation] can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to
confess to crimes they never committed”) (citing Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 891, 906-07 (2004)).
3
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
4
Drizin & Leo, 82 N.CL. Rev. at 945.
5
H. Snyder, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, Juvenile Arrests
2004 (Dec. 2006).
6
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 52353 (2005).
7
Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Lynda Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62
Rutgers L. Rev. 887, 904 (2010).
2
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of juvenile participants complied with a request to sign a false confession without uttering a
word of protest. 8 That study concluded that juveniles between the ages of twelve and sixteen
were far more likely to falsely confess than young adults between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six. 9
This higher incidence of false confessions among juveniles exists because standard police tactics
– which in all probability were designed with the hardened adult suspect in mind – are frequently
deployed against far softer targets: children and adolescents. 10 Despite their common use during
interrogations of children and adolescents, however, these tactics pose a particular risk to young
suspects. In recognition of this fact, even John E. Reid & Associates – the leading police
interrogation training firm in the country – recommends “special caution” when interrogating
children. 11 Sadly, this recommendation goes underemphasized in Reid’s interrogation manual
and trainings and is rarely implemented in real life.
The problem of false confessions from children is particularly troubling because once a
defendant has confessed, his or her conviction is all but guaranteed. Despite substantial evidence
to the contrary, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and even some defense attorneys continue to adhere
to the misapprehension that individuals do not confess to crimes they did not commit. As a
result, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that, for all practical purposes, “the introduction
of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous” – a statement that rings
true even for those who have falsely confessed. 12 In fact, confessions can be so prejudicial that
they can persuade jurors to convict despite the existence of significant exculpatory evidence,
such as conflicting physical evidence, contradictory accounts of witnesses, and alibis. 13
While the research on juvenile wrongful convictions is best developed in the arena of false
confessions, there is reason to believe that youth may be particularly vulnerable to other types of
evidentiary problems and errors that lead to wrongful convictions, as well. As crimes involving
children often happen in groups including other children, the witnesses presented against
children are more likely to be children themselves. 14 Those youthful witnesses may be
particularly vulnerable even to unintentional suggestion during line-ups and other eyewitness
identification procedures, due to an inherent desire to please authority figures or a simple desire
to end the unpleasant experience of being at the police station. 15 All this is to say, in short, that
no matter in which court their cases are tried, the mere fact of youthfulness makes children and
8

See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: Influence of Age and
Suggestibility, 27 L. & Hum. Behav. 141, 150-51 (2003).
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding Juvenile
Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 Behav. SC. L. 1, 1-24 (2007).
11
Cite to Reid Website.
12
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 316 (2d ed. 1972)).
13
See Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions Corrupt
Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 Psychol. Sci. 122 (Jan. 2009).
14
Tepfer, Nirider, & Tricarico at ___.
15
Tepfer, Nirider, & Tricarico, at 921.
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teens more likely to be wrongfully convicted. As it so happens, most cases involving teens end
up in juvenile court.
This fact, however, presents a second problem. The peculiar institution of juvenile court itself
can be, in Professor Steven Drizin’s words, a “breeding ground” for wrongful convictions and
constitutional violations, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Juvenile court originated as
an institution at the turn of the twentieth century, when reformers envisioned a body that would
handle young people’s transgressions with an eye to rehabilitation and treatment, rather than
punishment and long-term incarceration. 16 To facilitate this emphasis on rehabilitation, some of
the adversarial aspects of adult criminal court were removed from juvenile court; for instance, all
individuals in the courtroom – prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges alike – were conceived
of as benevolent actors seeking to promote children’s “best interests” and welfare. 17
Unfortunately, these well-intentioned features of juvenile court, over time, have bred a court
culture that today discourages and sometimes precludes zealous and adversarial advocacy. 18
Many juvenile courts continue to view zealous advocacy as “antithetical to rehabilitation.” 19
Some attorneys, believing that their client will be best served by submitting to the consequences
of a juvenile adjudication, may fail to research and investigate cases even when the client
requests it. 20 They may fail to interview witnesses or visit the crime scene; they may omit to file
pre-trial motions; they may even arrive at dispositional hearings unprepared. 21 Scholars have
suggested that ineffective assistance of counsel, sadly, is “routine and widespread” in this
context. 22 Without post-conviction access, however, much of this ineffectiveness can never be
remedied.
The apparent prevalence of ineffectiveness in juvenile court, in turn, circles back to an increased
risk of wrongful convictions. 23 By discouraging juvenile defenders from zealously subjecting
the State’s claims to the full-blown “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,” juvenile court
culture makes reliability a secondary concern. 24 In effect, accurate fact-finding can be
subordinated to the attorney’s or court’s perception of the child’s best interests and need for
treatment. 25

16

Drizin & Luloff, 262.
See Feld, Criminalizing, at 187.
18
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (noting that juvenile court proceedings lack the “fully adversary” character of adult
criminal trials).
19
Majd & Puritz, at 555.
20
See Fedders at 794-95.
21
Fedders, 792-93.
22
Fedders, 791.
23
See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (juvenile adjudications “may
well lack the reliability of real convictions in criminal courts”).
24
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
25
Majd & Puritz at 555-56 (describing reports that juvenile courts and judges place a “premium” on “maintaining a
friendly atmosphere” that discourages some attorneys from filing motions or pursuing defenses).
17
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Because of the potential for ineffective assistance of counsel and the susceptibility of juvenile
defendants to wrongful conviction, it is imperative to ensure that adjudicated juveniles have
access to post-conviction relief that will allow them to raise and remedy these issues in court.
Although adjudicated juveniles may not suffer consequences directly on par with convicted
criminals in adult court, adjudications of delinquency can and often do have far-reaching
collateral consequences, such as lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles who have been
adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses, 26 restrictions from serving in the military, 27
eviction from public housing, 28 and immigration-related penalties. 29 Unfortunately, however, the
nature and extent of juveniles’ access to post-conviction relief is far from clear in many
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, moreover, such access is explicitly denied.
B. National Outlook: Access Unclear
Efforts to prove innocence post-conviction are ubiquitous in jurisdictions all over the country. By
far, the most generally accepted means of proving innocence is through post-conviction DNA
testing. Since DNA technology was first used in 1989 as a forensic tool to prove innocence postconviction, individuals have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing in thirty-six
states. 30 Forty-eight states, 31 the District of Columbia, 32 and the federal government 33 have postconviction DNA testing statutes on the books. While these DNA testing laws have enabled 289
individuals to be proven innocent, not a single one of those individuals had been adjudicated
delinquent in juvenile court, despite the fact that every jurisdiction has a separate juvenile court
system. 34

26

See, e.g., 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5) and (3)(a) (2010); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003).
See Army Regulations 601-210, Paragraphs 4-4, 4-32(5) (2007).
28
See Dept. of HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133-36 (2002) (upholding the practice of evicting tenants from public
housing due to their illegal conduct).
29
See Wallace v. Gonzalez, 463 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’
consideration of a prior juvenile adjudication in deciding whether to grant an alien’s application for adjustment of
status).
30
Innocence Project Web Site – browsing profiles organized by state…
31
Only Massachusetts and Oklahoma do not currently have DNA testing statutes. On February 9, 2012, however,
the Massachusetts legislature passed Bill S. 1987, which if adopted would make Massachusetts the forty-ninth state
to enact a post-conviction DNA testing statute. The bill currently awaits the signature of the Governor. See
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/S01987; http://masslawyersweekly.com/the-docketblog/2012/02/09/post-conviction-dna-testing-bill-approved/.
32
DC Stat § 22-4133.
33
2004 Justice For All Act.
34
See Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court, Vol. 6 No. 3 (Winter 1996) (available online at
http://futureofchildren.org/publications/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=55&articleid=310) (all fifty states have
a juvenile court system); Juvenile Delinquents and Federal Criminal Law: The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
and Related Matters, Oct. 2004 (available online at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/1143) (discussing
scope of federal juvenile jurisdiction); State Justice Institute Conucil for Court Excellence, Guide to the D.C.
Juvenile Justice System, June 2009 (available online at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/DCJuvenileJusticeGuide.English%20Final.pdf) (discussing the District of
Columbia’s juvenile court system).
27
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A closer look at the various post-conviction DNA statutes may offer at least one explanation. Of
the fifty jurisdictions that have post-conviction DNA testing statutes, only five – Colorado, 35 the
District of Columbia, 36 New Hampshire, 37 South Carolina, 38 and Wisconsin 39 – explicitly allow
young people who have been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court to seek relief under those
statutes. While the remaining jurisdictions’ statutes do not address juvenile access to postconviction DNA testing, there are still strong reasons to believe that adjudicated juveniles may
not seek relief under many of those statutes.
The vast majority of DNA testing statutes share a common wording that limits access to those
“convicted of” a crime or felony. Forty-one jurisdictions use this language or something
similar. 40 The problem with this wording, however, is that it may have the effect of excluding
young people who have been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. 41 State and federal laws
generally draw a clear distinction between a “conviction” in criminal court and an “adjudication”
in juvenile court. 42 Take, for example, California law, which holds that “an order adjudging a
minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any
purpose.” 43 At the same time, California’s post-conviction DNA testing statute limits access to
35

Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-1-411(d) (including an individual incarcerated in “a juvenile facility following adjudication
for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult” among those who may access the statute).
36
DC Stat. §22-4133 (including those “adjudicated as a delinquent”).
37
NH Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-D:2 (providing access after “adjudication as a delinquent”)
38
S.C. Code 17-28-30 (including those “adjudicated delinquent”).
39
W.S.A. 974.07 (including those “adjudicated delinquent”).
40
Alaska (12.73.010), Arizona (A.R.S. 13-4240, Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. 16-112-20), California (Cal Penal Code
1405), Connecticut (54-102kk ), Delaware (11 Del. C. 4504), Florida (FSA 925.11) Georgia (Ga Code Ann. 5-5-41),
Hawaii (RS 844D-121), Idaho (Idaho Code 19-4901), Illinois (725 ILCS 5/166-3), Indiana (35-38-7-5), Iowa (ICA
81.10(1)), Kansas (KSA 21-2512), Louisiana (Art. 926.1), Maine (Me Rev Stat. 15 Sec. 2136-2138), Maryland
(Code of Crim Proc 8-201), Michigan (770.16), Minnesota, (590.01-.06), Montana (46-21-110), Nebraska (294120), Nevada (176.0918), New Jersey (2A:84A-32a), New Mexico (31-1A-2), North Carolina (15A-269), North
Dakota (29-32.1-15), Ohio (2953.71-.84), Oregon (136.690), Pennsylvania (42 sc. 9543) Rhode Island 10-9.1-12),
South Dakota (23-5B-1), Tennessee (40-30-303), Texas (CCP 64.01), Utah (78B-9-300) Vermont 13 VSA 5561),
Virginia 19.2-327.1), Washington 10.73.170), West Virginia (15-2b-14), Wyoming (7-12-301). See also infra note
44 for a discussion of Florida, Idaho, and Rhode Island’s statutes, which are worded slightly differently and may
present different issues of statutory interpretation.
Alabama and Kentucky limit their post-conviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of a “capital
offense.” Ala. Code 15-18-200; Ky Rev. Stat. Ann. 422.285. 13A-5-39. Although an adjudicated delinquent could
never receive a “capital sentence,” it appears, under those states’ definitions, that a juvenile could be adjudicated of
a capital offense. 13A-5-39 (Alabama defining a capital offense as “[a]n offense for which a defendant shall be
punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); KY
Rev Stat § 640.040 (noting that a youthful offender can be adjudicated of a capital offense).
41
It is fairly clear that juveniles charged and convicted in adult criminal court by means of transfer or who otherwise
are given an adult sentence would be allowed to access DNA testing statutes. See e.g., NM Stat § 32A-2-18(C) (“If
a judgment on a proceeding under the Delinquency Act results in an adult sentence, the determination of guilt at trial
becomes a conviction for purposes of the Criminal Code.” )
42
See e.g. People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157 (2006) (holding that a juvenile who escapes from juvenile detention after
an adjudication of delinquency cannot be convicted under an escape statute that limits its application to those
“convicted of a felony”); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that juvenile
delinquency is "an adjudication of status--not a criminal conviction”).
42
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 203.
43
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 203 (italics added).
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“any person convicted of a felony.” 44 Under basic principles of statutory construction, it is
difficult to imagine that an adjudicated juvenile is encompassed within the statute. 45
The structure of the Maine statutory scheme suggests the same conclusion. Access to postconviction DNA testing in Maine is governed by Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15 § 2138, which allows “a
person convicted of and sentenced for” certain crimes to seek testing. 46 The statute does
delineate those who may seek relief – such as individuals who are on parole – but adjudicated
juveniles are not mentioned. 47 Even further, Maine statutory and case law makes clear that a
delinquency adjudication is not the equivalent of a felony conviction. 48 And the Maine statute
governing non-DNA post-conviction claims for relief specifies clearly that adjudicated juveniles
may seek relief under that statute – thus suggesting an intentional contrast between the scopes of
the non-DNA and DNA post-conviction statutes. 49 While there does not appear to be any case
law in Maine addressing this issue, 50 this statutory backdrop suggests that adjudicated juveniles
may not be able to access the DNA testing statute.
In fact, there appears to be little case law addressing this precise question in any jurisdiction. One
of the few courts to address the issue – in Texas -- has strongly suggested that juveniles cannot
seek DNA testing when the DNA testing statute limits relief to those who have been “convicted.”
Texas’ post-conviction DNA testing statute is found at Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 64.01,

44

Cal. Penal Code 1405.
Three states use language that is also ambiguous as to whether it applies to adjudicated juveniles but that may
allow for better statutory interpretation arguments that it does. Mississippi allows access to “any person sentenced
by a court of record of the State of Mississippi;” 99-39-5, Missouri allows “a person in the custody of the
department of corrections” to file a motion, 547.035; and New York states that a “defendant” may bring a motion.
NY CPL 440.30(1a).
Two states use statutory language that allows access to individuals “convicted of, or sentenced to” a crime
or felony. See Idaho (19-4901); Rhode Island (10-9.1-12). Juvenile petitioners in these states may have stronger
statutory interpretation arguments for access by saying that they were “sentenced,” even if not convicted. But see
United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 169, n.3 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting that “[u]nder the New Jersey Code of
Juvenile Justice, juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not sentenced but rather are subject to a "dispositional
hearing”) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-41); People v. J.J.M. (In re J.J.M.), 299 Ill. App. 3d 327 (2d Dist. Il App.
1998) (adjudicated juveniles are neither convicted nor given sentences). The vast majority of state statutes,
however, if the term “sentencing” appears, use the conjunction “and,” which does not appear to aid the statutory
argument. See e.g. Arizona (ARS 13-4240) (limited to individuals “convicted of and sentenced for”); Connecticut
(“convicted of a crime and sentenced to”); Hawaii (HRS 844D-121 (convicted of and sentenced for”). One state,
Florida, presents a similar issue: Its statute permits DNA testing for those who have been “found guilty,” which
could arguably include adjudicated juveniles. West's F.S.A. § 925.11. See A.S.F. v. State, 70 So. 3d 754 (Fl. Ct.
App. 2011) (discussing a juvenile who was “found guilty” of a crime); but see State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 111
(Fla. S. Ct. 2002) (if the legislature had intended to include adjudicated juveniles within the scope of a different Act,
it could have specifically said so).
46
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15 § 2138.
47
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15 § 2138(1).
48
15 M.R.S. § 3310(6) (2010); State v. Brockelbank, 2011 ME 118.
49
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15 § 2121-2132; see specifically 2121(1) (specifying that a “criminal judgment” under this
statute includes an “adjudication and disposition in a juvenile case”).
50
Only two published appellate cases address the post-conviction DNA statute in Maine. See Cooksen v. State, 17
A.3d 1208 (2011); State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772 (2004). Neither address this issue.
45
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which allows “a convicted person” to seek testing. 51 In the case of In re R.J.M., 52 a juvenile
sought leave to seek relief under this statute after his adjudication for aggravated sexual assault.
The lower court denied the motion, finding that there were “no reasonable grounds for a motion
to be filed.” 53 In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court noted that the
legislature did not explicitly authorize a juvenile’s appeal of a denial of such a motion. 54 The
court explained that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not generally apply to adjudicated
juveniles unless the legislature specifically “evinces a contrary intent.” 55 It went on to note that
there was no contrary intent manifest in the DNA testing statute; rather, the statute is limited to
those who have been “convicted,” and the Texas Family Code specifically states that “an order
of an adjudication . . . is not a conviction of crime.” 56 Although the specific holding in this case
was that an adjudicated juvenile cannot appeal the denial of a DNA testing motion, the decision
strongly suggests that an adjudicated juvenile also cannot file such a motion in the first place.
Beyond the fundamental unfairness of not allowing adjudicated juveniles opportunities to prove
their innocence, the apparent lack of juvenile access to post-conviction DNA testing in most
jurisdictions also creates a troubling contradiction. The vast majority of states require juveniles
to contribute a DNA sample to the national DNA database known as CODIS after an
adjudication of guilt in juvenile court. 57 For example, Kentucky and California, which appear to
deny juveniles the right to seek post-conviction DNA testing, still require adjudicated juveniles
to submit their DNA profiles into CODIS. 58 These statutory schemes create an odd dichotomy:
Juveniles’ DNA can be used only to prove their guilt, not their innocence.
Statutes and rules governing the availability of other, non-DNA forms of collateral relief – such
as state-level writs of habeas corpus – often suffer from the same infirmity as the DNA statutes:
in many jurisdictions, it remains uncertain as to whether such relief is available to adjudicated
juveniles. For example, Arizona’s R. Crim. P. 32.1 provides one method for pursuing state-level
post-conviction relief; as with the vast majority of DNA testing statutes, however, this provision
limits access to those who have been “convicted” of a criminal offense. 59 Indeed, the Arizona
statute explicitly lists several categories of defendants who are permitted to file under this section
– such as those who have violated probation – yet it omits to mention adjudicated juveniles. 60
Given this statutory backdrop, it is unclear – if not unlikely – that this provision is applicable to

51

Texas C.C.P. Art. 64.01(a-1).
211 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. App. 2006).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.13 (a)).
57
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/statute_grid_4_5_2006.html
58
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.174; Cal. Penal Code § 296 .
59
AZ R. Crim. Proc. 32.1.
60
Id.
52

8

adjudicated juveniles. In other states, including North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island, it is equally doubtful that adjudicated juveniles may seek relief. 61
Although some states explicitly allow equal access 62 – including Maine, as outlined above –
there are a handful of court decisions throughout the country that explicitly prohibit adjudicated
juveniles from seeking state-court collateral remedies. Adjudicated juveniles in Illinois are not
permitted to seek relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the traditional means by
which adult criminals raise non-forensic actual innocence claims and other constitutional
violations. 63 Similarly, neither Arkansas 64 nor Texas 65 juveniles have access to state habeas
corpus relief.
The South Carolina statutory scheme also appears to prohibit adjudicated juveniles from seeking
non-DNA collateral relief. Recall that South Carolina was one of only five states to explicitly
state in its post-conviction DNA testing statute that those who have been “convicted of or
adjudicated delinquent” may seek DNA testing. 66 Conversely, South Carolina’s Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act limits access to non-forensic collateral relief to those persons who
have been “convicted” of a crime. 67 The legislature’s failure to explicitly mention adjudicated
juveniles in this statute when it had done so in the DNA context strongly suggests that juveniles
do not have access to non-DNA collateral remedies.
Other statutory schemes provide some means for adjudicated juveniles to seek collateral
remedies even while limiting their access to a greater degree than similarly situated adults.
Consider Illinois, which, as explained above, prohibits juvenile access to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act but does allow adults and juveniles alike to seek relief from judgments to correct

61

See N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01 (North Dakota statute limiting access to post-conviction procedures to a person
“convicted of and sentenced for a crime”); O.R.S. 419C.400 (Oregon statute limited to “person convicted of a
crime”); PA Stat Ann. 42 Sec. 9543 (PA statute limiting post-conviction relief to petitioners “convicted of a crime”);
Rhode Island 10-9.1-1 (Rhode Island statue limiting post-conviction relief to person “convicted of or sentenced for”
a crime);
62
See e.g., Alabama Code 15-12-23(b) (allowing judges to appoint counsel for adjudicated juveniles seeking habeas
corpus or other collateral relief); D.C. Code 16-2335.01(a) (allowing adjudicated juveniles to seek a new hearing on
the grounds of actual innocence); In the Interest of J.M., 103 N.J. Super. 88 (1968) (allowing the delinquent juvenile
collateral relief); Ohio R.C. 2953.21 (allowing “any person convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a
delinquent child” to pursue collateral relief); Robinson v. Boley State School for Boys, 554 P.2d 44 (1976) (holding
that as a matter of equal protection, juveniles must be afforded access to post-conviction procedures); State ex rel.
R.S. v. Trent, 169 W. Va. 493 (1982) (granting state habeas relief to West Virginia juvenile).
63
See In Re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 322 (2001) (citing In re A. W. H., 95 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1107 (1981); In re R. R.,
75 Ill. App. 3d 494, 496 (1979) for the proposition that the Illinois high court has not reviewed lower court decisions
holding that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings); see also People v.
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996) (explaining that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act can be utilized to make claims
of actual innocence and other constitutional violations).
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errors of fact. 68 Although adult criminal defendants have a two-year period in which they can
pursue this relief, the Illinois statutory scheme allows adjudicated juveniles only one year to
pursue equivalent relief. 69 There is no reason apparent in the statutes for this discrepancy.
In short, most jurisdictions have not established clear rules as to whether adjudicated juveniles
have the same rights as adults to seek relief through post-conviction proceedings. Despite this
lack of clarity, there is good reason to believe that access to all forms of post-conviction relief is
severely limited for many adjudicated juveniles across the country. As exemplified by the two
Illinois case studies below, these limitations are, or can be, disastrous.
Section II
A. Case Study: Alberto M.
In early 1999, Alberto M., a twelve-year-old Latino boy living in Chicago with his parents, older
sister, and two younger brothers, was having a difficult time. 70 His mother suffered from
depression, anxiety, and possible bipolar disorder 71while his father abused drugs and alcohol, 72
leading to a volatile home environment. 73 Perhaps in response, Alberto started lashing out and
acting inappropriately, getting in some trouble at school and at home. It wasn’t long before he
started encountering law enforcement. In March, after an altercation with his mother, he was
arrested for domestic battery. 74 The case never made it to court, but it signaled some mounting
problems for Alberto.
In May, a distraught Alberto started telling friends that he was going to kill himself. 75 When he
was discovered with a rope and a knife, he was admitted to Children’s Memorial Hospital, where
he received two weeks of intensive psychological therapy. 76 He was put on antidepressants and
drugs designed to mitigate his attention deficit disorder. 77
Alberto’s problems multiplied greatly in September, however, when the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against him, alleging that Alberto
committed acts of sexual penetration against his nine-year-old brother, Evan. 78 According to the
charges and court records, it was alleged that Alberto, who by this time had turned thirteen years
68
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old, was in his room with his brother Evan when he became aroused by a female wrestler on the
television. 79 Alberto then allegedly sexually penetrated his brother. 80 Law enforcement learned
of this after Evan allegedly told their mother, who alerted the police. 81 Alberto then confessed,
while nine-year-old Evan also made statements implicating his brother. 82
Alberto, however, told a far different version of the events that led to his charges. Alberto stated
that he and his brother were swimming nude in a family member’s pool. While they were
playing in the water, they began re-enacting a scene from Mulan – a 1998 animated Disney film
– in which Alberto lifted his younger brother over his head. As they were doing so, their mother
entered the pool area, saw them naked, overreacted, and called the police. When brought to the
police station, Alberto was bombarded with questions from police officers, who accused him of
committing sexual acts against his brother. After what seemed like hours of constant questioning
and the police’s adamant refusal to accept his denials, Alberto gave in. Scared and confused, he
admitted to what the police were saying he did to his brother. Next thing Alberto knew, he was
shipped off to the detention center and charged with serious crimes in juvenile court.
While Alberto was released from detention after just a couple of days, he wasn’t allowed back
home. As the case wound its way through juvenile court, he was placed in the custody of the
pastor of the family’s church. 83 Alberto’s problems, however, continued. Shortly after the New
Year, Alberto was readmitted to the hospital for a week’s worth of psychological treatment. 84
Alberto had been acting very erratically, including incidents of uncontrolled laughter or sobbing,
and teachers reported that he spoke nonsensically at times. 85 He had run away twice and had
allegedly verbally and physically intimidated his guardian. 86 His older sister had been
hospitalized following her own suicide attempt just two weeks earlier. 87 After his hospital
admission, Alberto was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was prescribed lithium. 88
At the same time, however, the State’s case against Alberto suffered a significant setback. Per a
court order, Alberto was evaluated by a psychologist, who determined that he was incapable of
knowingly understanding and waiving his Miranda rights. 89 In light of these conclusions, the
Cook County State’s Attorney was in all probability barred from using Alberto’s confession
against him. Perhaps in response, the State offered Alberto a deal: in exchange for dropping the
seven of the eight allegations, including the most serious charges, Alberto could plead guilty to
one count of sexual conduct with a family member under the age of eighteen and avoid detention
79
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entirely. 90 The deal required him to be on probation for five years and do some community
service. 91 Alberto’s counsel also explained to him that it would require his registration as a sex
offender for a period of ten years. 92 Given the seriousness of the charges, his other family and
medical problems, and the risk of a long period of detention if he went to trial, Alberto
reluctantly decided to take the deal, despite his private insistence that he was innocent. In mid2000, Alberto accepted the terms as read to him by his juvenile court judge and signed a form
that required his registration as a sex offender for ten years. That form was later read into the
record in open court by the prosecutor. 93
Over the next year or so, unsurprisingly, Alberto’s psychological and emotional problems only
grew. He missed school and counseling appointments frequently; stopped taking his medications;
had multiple violent episodes involving family members and classmates; and, in mid-2001, after
again making suicidal statements, was hospitalized yet again. 94 Over this same time period, his
parents separated and sought a divorce. 95 In November, he was arrested on two separate
occasions. 96
In early 2002, however, Alberto entered a therapeutic day school and began treatment with a new
counselor. 97 Although his improvements were gradual, they were significant. Alberto’s violent
episodes began to subside. He improved his grades, attended his counseling sessions, and
consistently took his medication. 98 In July 2005, he was discharged from probation, having
satisfactorily met all the requirements. 99 The Cook County Juvenile Probation Department issued
a report deeming him unlikely to sexually offend in the future, and in fact, he had not been
adjudicated or convicted of any offense – sexual or otherwise – since his guilty plea in July
2000. 100 Alberto had also consistently complied with his annual sex offender registration
duties. 101
By his early twenties, it was clear that Alberto had entirely turned his life around. He had
graduated from high school and now had a solid career as a department head at home
improvement store. 102 He was making more than $25 an hour when he worked overtime, which
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was often. 103 He was the primary means of financial support for his mother and two younger
brothers, including Evan, with whom he lived. 104 He had a girlfriend and an older male friend
who was a close mentor. 105 In his spare time, Alberto wrote lyrics and produced his own
music. 106 He even found time to take some classes at a community college; pursuant to sex
offender registration regulations, however, he was required to alert the administration of his
status as a sex offender. Feeling ostracized by school administrators, he dropped out. 107 All
told, Alberto was eagerly looking forward to July 2010, when he was due to complete his sex
offender registration requirements. At that time, he felt that he would be able to move beyond
his past life for good.
In late 2009, however, Alberto learned something very troubling. Law enforcement began telling
him that his registration was not due to be terminated and that he was going to have to register as
a sex offender for the rest of his life. 108 Alberto was shocked, as he recalled his lawyer
specifically informing him that his registration duties would last only ten years. 109 The ten-year
limit had been a crucial factor in Alberto’s choice to plead guilty, as his counsel had thoroughly
relayed how arduous and embarrassing the registration requirements were. 110 Alberto
immediately sought the advice of counsel, hoping that there was a way he could terminate his
registration requirements or somehow prove his innocence and get the charges vacated.
Alberto’s counsel – who are the authors of this article – soon determined that under applicable
Illinois law, the offense to which Alberto had pled did in fact require lifetime registration, even
though Alberto had been a juvenile. 111 After ordering the court file and transcripts, however,
counsel soon discovered that Alberto was never informed of this. To the contrary, the juvenile
court judge’s guilty plea admonishments specifically stated that Alberto was only required to
register for ten years. 112 A boilerplate court form, signed and initialed by Alberto, said the same
thing. 113 Counsel also interviewed Alberto’s former public defender; while she had no specific
recollection of the case, she did recall some confusion about the length of his sex offender
registration obligations. In a notarized affidavit, Alberto swore that his counsel informed him
that the requirements would last just ten years and that he relied on this information in choosing
to plead guilty. 114
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At the same time, counsel began to investigate Alberto’s claim of innocence by speaking to
Alberto’s younger brother Evan, the alleged victim. Alberto had warned his counsel that he did
not know what Evan was going to say, given that the family never had spoken much about the
alleged assault. When counsel met with Evan, who was now an eighteen-year-old high school
senior, Evan stated without hesitation that the assault never happened. 115 He told a similar story
to Alberto’s: Their mother overreacted when she saw the two brothers playing naked in a family
member’s pool. 116 He recalled being questioned as a nine-year-old by multiple police officers
about whether Alberto had assaulted him in a sexual way; specifically, he recalled feeling scared
and fearing that he was going to go to jail. 117 Due to his youth, Evan could not recall whether he
ultimately had told the police that Alberto had assaulted him, but he repeatedly declared that
even if he did make that statement, it wasn’t true: his brother had never sexually assaulted him in
any way. 118 Evan signed a notarized affidavit documenting this story and promised to testify
consistently in court if he was ever called to do so. 119
Armed with this new evidence, Alberto was geared up to pursue relief in the Illinois courts. His
counsel intended to raise a claim of actual innocence based on Evan’s affidavit as well as due
process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the affirmative misinformation that
Alberto’s attorney had told him about the length of his registration requirements. 120
These efforts, however, were soon stymied. Alberto’s attorney discovered that Illinois law
precluded juveniles from filing petitions under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 121 the
traditional means by which a criminal defendant raises claims of actual innocence or
constitutional violations based on newly discovered evidence. 122 Instead, the only way for
Alberto to pursue any sort of collateral relief in juvenile court was to file a so-called petition for
relief from final order, a traditional civil remedy that must be raised within one year of the date
of adjudication. 123 One year, of course, had long since passed. When Alberto attempted
nevertheless to file claims under this statute, a juvenile court judge refused to entertain his
claims, citing the time limitation. 124 Despite the fact that Alberto had evidence of his innocence;
that his defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge had affirmatively given him misinformation that
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induced his guilty plea; and that any delay in raising these issues was in no way Alberto’s fault,
Alberto had no legal vehicle for presenting his claims to the court. 125
B. Case Study: Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr
On the afternoon of November 19, 1991, fourteen-year-old Cateresa Matthews was on her way
home from school in the close-knit, south Chicago suburb of Dixmoor. 126 Just as she did every
day, she walked from Rosa L. Parks Middle School to her great-grandmother’s house, where she
ate a home-cooked meal. 127 After bidding her great-grandmother goodbye, she then walked to a
nearby city bus stop, where she usually caught the bus that took her home. 128 Inexplicably,
however, Cateresa never arrived home. As the afternoon stretched into the evening, her mother
placed several increasingly frantic telephone calls to the local police, hospitals, and Cateresa’s
friends and schoolmates – all to no avail. The next morning, Cateresa was still nowhere to be
found.
Nearly three weeks later, Cateresa was still considered a missing person by authorities until a
Dixmoor resident named Jesus Novoa made a shocking discovery. On the afternoon of
December 8, Novoa was walking along a grassy area next to Interstate 57, which ran through his
residential neighborhood. 129 Along a foot-hewn path that ran through tall grasses, he stumbled
across the body of Cateresa Matthews. 130 She was lying on her back with her pants removed and
her underwear dangling off one ankle. 131 A spent .25-caliber bullet casing sat on her chest. 132
She had been shot in the mouth. 133
After Novoa and his family members called the police, crime scene investigators arrived on the
scene. Almost immediately, they concluded that Cateresa had been killed recently. Her body
did not show signs of decomposition or animal predation, as would be expected after three weeks
in an open field. 134 Blood was still draining from her body, also suggesting a recent death. 135
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And rigor mortis, which usually disappears within 36 hours of death, was present in her limbs. 136
Based on these observations, her autopsy report concluded that she had been killed the day her
body was discovered: December 8, 1991. 137
Because her body was found on state property adjacent to the interstate, Dixmoor authorities
handed the investigation over to the Illinois State Police. Their investigation, however, led
nowhere. After canvassing the neighborhood and interviewing Cateresa’s friends and relatives,
police were at an apparent loss for leads. Beginning in late February 1992, police reports reflect
an eight-month period of law enforcement inactivity as Cateresa’s murder transformed from an
electrifying crime into just another cold case.
That changed in October 1992, when police reports reflect that a fifteen-year-old student at Rosa
Parks brought them new information. According to reports, this young informant told police that
another fifteen-year-old classmate, Jonathan Barr, had told him that he had seen Cateresa getting
into a car with two other teens – Robert Taylor and Robert Lee Veal – on the day she
disappeared. 138 Interestingly, Barr was the younger brother of Cateresa’s ex-boyfriend James
Harden. And both Barr and Harden lived only a half-block away from where Cateresa’s body
was found.
Armed with this information, the police brought Robert Lee Veal to the local State’s Attorney’s
Office for questioning nine days later. Like Barr and Taylor, Veal was also fifteen; but unlike
them, he suffered from severe learning disabilities and was generally considered slow. 139
Despite his limitations, police interrogated Veal about the crime for hours without a parent or
guardian present. 140 After several hours of questioning, Veal agreed to sign a statement that was
written out by law enforcement. 141 In that statement, Veal admitted to participating in the gangrape and murder of Cateresa Matthews, along with four other teens: Jonathan Barr, Robert
Taylor, seventeen-year-old James Harden, and seventeen-year-old Shainne Sharp. 142
The police arrested and interrogated Robert Taylor next. Again, after hours of interrogation,
Taylor did as Veal had done: he signed a statement written out by law enforcement in which he
admitted to participating in the gang-rape and murder of Cateresa with the same group of
teens. 143 Two days later, police interrogated Shainne Sharp under similar circumstances; after
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enduring nearly a day of questioning without a parent or attorney present, he too signed a similar
statement. 144
The three inculpatory statements all admitted to the same basic nexus of events: an assault on
Cateresa in the field where her body was found, with at least four of the five boys raping her and
James Harden shooting her. 145 The three accounts wildly diverged, however, when it came to
the surrounding events. Taylor described being picked up from school by a car containing the
other four boys and Cateresa; the group then allegedly drove directly to the field where the
assault occurred. 146 Sharp described being picked up from a basketball game by a car containing
Taylor, Harden, and Veal – although he didn’t know Veal’s name and called him simply “the
light-skinned dude” – and then being driven to Harden’s house to play dice, where Barr and
Cateresa joined them. 147 For his part, Veal described being picked up on his way home from a
local candy store by Taylor, Harden, and Sharp, who were in a car together; a few minutes later,
they also picked up Barr and Cateresa and then supposedly drove straight to the crime scene. 148
All three teens, however, agreed on one key fact. According to all three confessions, the assault
and murder happened on the same day that Cateresa disappeared: November 19, 1991.
Following the confessions, all five teens were arrested and charged with a host of offenses,
including Cateresa’s sexual assault and murder. As the defendants awaited trial, law
enforcement decided to take one further investigative step in order to corroborate the confessions
with physical evidence: Using early DNA testing techniques, they asked the Illinois State Police
Crime Lab to compare the DNA from the semen left inside Cateresa’s body against the DNA of
the charged boys. 149 That scientific testing, however, left law enforcement with two surprising
results. First, it turned out that the DNA was left by a single male donor – not by four or five
different individuals, as would be consistent with the three confessions. 150 Second, and even
more notably, scientific testing conclusively established that the semen had not been left by any
of the five charged teens. 151 Instead, it belonged to some unknown man.
Despite this startling result, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office barreled forward with all
five prosecutions. Because of their ages, Taylor and Barr had to be charged in juvenile court,
meaning that they faced far less prison time if they were adjudicated delinquent; but the State
proceeded to file motions requesting their transfer to adult criminal court, where they could face
sentences of life in prison. After hearing argument, however, the juvenile court judge made an
unusual decision: despite the seriousness of the charged offenses, he declined to transfer Taylor
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and Barr’s cases to adult criminal court. 152 In so concluding, he reasoned that – despite the
existence of multiple written confessions – there was not sufficient evidence such that a grand
jury would be expected to issue an indictment in adult proceedings. 153 Key to his decision was
the fact that the three confessions simply got the date of Cateresa’s death wrong: “How could
they charge these guys with killing and raping this girl on November 19? She didn’t die until
December 8.” 154
The State immediately appealed this decision and the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, sending
Taylor and Barr’s cases straight to adult criminal court. 155 With all five teenage defendants now
facing adult time, the State was in a powerful position. Prosecutors accordingly offered Sharp
and Veal sweetheart deals: if they pled guilty and testified against Taylor, Harden, and Barr, they
would serve only about eight years in prison. 156 Both Sharp and Veal accepted the deals; and
based on their testimony (and, in Taylor’s case, on his confession), Harden, Taylor, and Barr
were convicted as adults and sentenced to the equivalent of life in prison. 157
Some seventeen years later, attorneys for Harden, Taylor, and Barr (including the authors of this
article) filed post-conviction motions for DNA testing under 725 ILCS 5/116-3. 158 Over the
intervening time, law enforcement had constructed the CODIS database, which contains the
DNA of various offenders and charged individuals – a database that did not exist at the time of
the Cateresa Matthews murder trials. 159 Although it was already known that the DNA left on
Cateresa’s body did not belong to the defendants, defense attorneys reasoned that perhaps the
DNA donor could finally be identified. After the trial court agreed to grant the motions, the
DNA testing proceeded – and on March 9, 2011, it was finally learned that the DNA belonged to
a man named Willie Randolph. 160
Additional investigation revealed damning information about Randolph. He was much older
than the five convicted defendants – thirty-three years old at the time of Cateresa’s murder. 161
He lived only a mile away from Cateresa’s great-grandmother’s house in Dixmoor. 162 And he
had a history of sexual violence. In 1977, Randolph had been convicted for raping a woman on
the street. 163 Perhaps most strikingly, when he was in his early twenties, he also reportedly
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sexually assaulted his fourteen-year-old girlfriend in the very same field in which Cateresa’s
body was later found in 1991. 164
Armed with this new evidence, defense attorneys filed post-conviction motions to vacate the
convictions of all five of the convicted defendants. 165 After the State eventually dropped its
opposition to those motions, the court vacated the convictions of Harden, Taylor, and Barr on
November 3, 1991 – only sixteen days shy of the twentieth anniversary of Cateresa’s
disappearance. 166 Now in their mid-thirties, Harden, Taylor, and Barr were immediately released
from prison; within weeks, the guilty pleas and convictions of Sharp and Veal – who had long
ago finished their reduced prison sentences – were vacated, too. As of the writing of this article,
the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office has not filed charges against Willie Randolph in
connection with Cateresa Matthews’ death.
The story of these five defendants carries, at the least, the satisfaction of knowing that a longfestering injustice was corrected, albeit decades too late, through post-conviction proceedings.
But the frightening corollary to that reality is the knowledge that, in Illinois, such a resolution
might not have been available for Taylor and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile court.
The Illinois statutory provision that enabled them to file their motion for DNA testing – 725
ILCS 5/116-3 – permits a defendant to move for forensic testing in the trial court that entered
judgment on his or her “conviction.” Generally speaking, Illinois jurisprudence has
distinguished between juveniles “adjudicated delinquent” in juvenile court and adults
“convicted” in criminal court. 167 Juveniles, for instance, are not permitted to file post-conviction
petitions under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 168 While no case in Illinois has yet
extended this reasoning to post-conviction motions for DNA testing, that legal vehicle may well
be deemed unavailable to juveniles too; at minimum, it is unclear whether juveniles have access
to DNA testing after their adjudications. Thus, despite the righteousness of their cause, access to
the exonerating power of post-conviction DNA testing could easily have been denied to Taylor
and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile court – a sad irony, given that the institution of
juvenile court was intended to provide extra protections for vulnerable juveniles.
Section III
In most ways, of course, Alberto was very lucky that his case was adjudicated in juvenile court
rather than being transferred to adult criminal court. The charges against him were very serious
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and could have carried up to thirty years in prison if he had been convicted in criminal court. 169
Robert, for his part, was equally unlucky: Had his case remained in juvenile court, he would
have been out of prison no later than his twenty-first birthday instead of languishing behind bars
until age thirty-four for a crime he did not commit. On the other hand, Illinois laws prevented
Alberto from pursuing his innocence post-conviction or arguing that he had received
constitutionally deficient counsel, because he was tried in juvenile court. At the same time,
Robert has been able to clear his name only because he was subjected to the jurisdiction and
penalties of criminal court.
Because juveniles like Alberto and Robert face a heightened risk of wrongful conviction and a
potentially heightened risk of ineffective assistance of counsel – and because the direct and
collateral consequences of a delinquency adjudication can be severe -- it is fair, just, and urgently
necessary for legislatures to amend post-conviction statutes to ensure access for adjudicated
juveniles. The required amendment is also uncomplicated: In the context of post-conviction
DNA testing, the forty-one jurisdictions that currently make post-conviction relief available to
those who have been “convicted” of crimes should simply add the phrase “or adjudicated
delinquent” to their statutes. That is essentially what Colorado, the District of Columbia, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have done – and the addition of those simple words
has brought a dictionary’s worth of clarity to the law. Indeed, the same thing can be done in
statutes governing the availability of non-forensic collateral remedies. These simple amendments
will ensure that adjudicated juveniles are given the same desperately needed access to postconviction proceedings that convicted adults receive.
One Virginia legislator is more than doing his part. Moved by the story of Virginia resident
Edgar Coker, Jr., Republican General Assembly Delegate Gregory D. Habeeb has introduced
legislation in Virginia that would actually increase juveniles’ post-conviction access even above
the level of access that convicted adults typically receive. 170 Edgar Coker, Jr. spent seventeen
months in detention – and still remains on the sex offender registry – after he pled guilty to
raping a fourteen-year-old peer. 171 He entered the plea instead of risking adult charges and a far
greater sentence. 172 Since that time, however, Edgar’s “victim” has admitted that she lied about
being raped and that she had consented to the sex. 173 She and her mother have been fighting to
vacate Edgar’s adjudication and remove him from the sex offender registry, but the Virginia
courts have refused, claiming that no statute allows them to grant Edgar relief and thus that their
hands are tied. 174 Delegate Habeeb has taken steps to correct this situation by introducing a bill
that would allow adjudicated juveniles who plead guilty to seek a post-conviction writ of
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innocence; currently, neither adults nor juveniles who plead guilty may seek that form of
relief. 175 In so doing, he has recognized the critical importance of juvenile access to collateral
proceedings.
Legislators, advocates, and other stakeholders throughout the country must take similar steps to
amend the law in their home jurisdictions to ensure that juveniles and adults have equal access to
post-conviction relief. For Alberto, Robert, Jonathan, Edgar, and many more like them around
the country, such steps could represent huge advances in juveniles’ access to justice.
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